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So uth As ia
A P A R N A  RA O
This past year has witnessed India and Pakistan bat-
tling over an area that has known little peace since
1947. While the two states speak of ÔnationalismÕ,
ÔsecularismÕ or ÔMuslim unityÕ, and various Islamist
organizations call for j e h a d, most Kashmiris speak of
Ôself-determinationÕ and ÔKashmiri identityÕ. The idea
of self-determination as independence was first for-
mulated in 1947 by the last Hindu Dogra Maharaja,
Hari Singh. The concept of a distinct Kashmiri identi-
ty (k a s h m i r i y a t) evolved in the 1930s with a move-
ment, explicitly involving both Muslim and Hindu in-
telligentsia, against feudal-cum-colonial rule. The
notion of a discrete Kashmiri citizenship goes back to
the 1920s, when Kashmiri Hindus, facing competi-
tion from Punjabi Hindus, pressed for a formal defi-
nition of Ôstate subjectsÕ.
S e l f - D e t e r m i n a t i o n
in Kashmir: 
Identity, Islam, and
the Search for Justice
With South Asian decolonization and the
creation of Pakistan and India in 1947, the
Kashmiri struggle attained international
proportions. While Hari Singh signed the
conditional accession of the state to the In-
dian Union, and India and Pakistan fought
their first war, the Jammu and Kashmir Lib-
eration Front (JKLF) was formed to free
Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. The
United Nations cease-fire declaration in
1949 split Jammu and Kashmir into roughly
65% (east and south of the cease-fire line)
and 35% (to the west and north) controlled
by India and Pakistan respectively. The Paki-
stani portion is inhabited mostly by non-
Kashmiri Sunni Muslims, with Shias in pock-
ets. The Indian portion consists of several
distinct areas, the Valley, inhabited over-
whelmingly by Kashmiris (largely Sunni,
with Shia, Hindu and Sikh minorities), being
the most problematic. 
Till 1953 efforts towards social justice con-
tinued: feudal rule was abolished, and land
and tax reforms were undertaken by the Na-
tional Conference (NC) government under
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Welcomed
especially by the unbelievably poor rural
Valley Muslims and lower-caste Hindus to
the south, they antagonized wealthy Mus-
lims and Hindus, notably the landed gentry,
who received no compensation. The NCÕs
urban popularity continued, largely be-
cause of Abdullah«s adherence to k a s h m i r i-
y a t. While the Valley waited impatiently for
the promised plebiscite, to the south, citing
Indian nationalism, the communal and ob-
scurantist Praja Parishad Ð many of whose
members were adversely affected by the
land reforms Ð and the Rashtriya Swayamse-
vak Sangh incited fear among Hindu and
Sikh refugees from Pakistan about renewed
atrocities by Muslims, were a plebiscite to
take place. Against this background the
ÔDelhi AgreementÕ was signed in July 1952,
spelling out the mutual limits of authority of
the Kashmiri and Indian states and reneging
on the promised plebiscite. It denied the
ethos of k a s h m i r i y a t and was never accept-
ed by most Kashmiris. All vestiges of democ-
racy were shed in 1953 with AbdullahÕs dis-
missal by the Indian government and his in-
carceration till 1968.
While crushing dissent, India now em-
barked on creating a consumer culture. The
Valley had a dense structure of ties cutting
across trade, bureaucracy, artisanship, cash
crop horticulture and politics. Both those
who wanted independence and those who
favoured accession to Pakistan Ð and these
included many among the Muslim landed
gentry and the mercantile class Ð were part
of these networks. Political opponents were
now co-opted into the system of economic
benefits, primarily through Indian subsidies.
Little moral opprobrium was attached to
the massive corruption that resulted, since
ÔIndian moneyÔ was involved. A middle class
emerged which could ill afford to be openly
anti-India, while participating in a sullen op-
position to Indian rule. Economic gains per-
colated down to the villages, but migration
to towns continued and the number of un-
employed youth grew. With issues of social
justice neglected, muffled dissent and una-
bated Pakistani propaganda, the idea of
Kashmiri nationalist resistance also grew.
The Algerian struggle against France, the
Vietnam war and the Palestinian movement
all had their impact. Working-class Muslim
teenagers often demonstrated, many being
routinely arrested, manhandled, and humili-
ated. 
The emergence of religion
a s a factor
In 1972, following the third Indo-Pakistan
war and the formation of Bangladesh, India
and Pakistan signed the ÔSimla AccordÕ, ex-
plicitly ignoring the wishes of the Kashmiri
people. Also in 1972, while members of the
Plebiscite Front were debarred from con-
testing elections, the Indian Congress Party
ensured the JamaÕat-e Islami (JI) a victory
against the NC in five seats. The notions of
k a s h m i r i y a t and self-determination ap-
peared more dangerous to Indian rule than
Islamic fundamentalism. Politically, the JI re-
mained weak and won only one seat in the
first and last fair elections in 1977, but it was
inculcating fundamentalism and inciting
hatred and contempt for non-Muslims in
schools in villages where state schools often
existed only nominally. Hindu fundamental-
ists now also began inculcating a brand of
Hinduism entirely alien to Kashmir. Between
1933 and 1986 the Valley witnessed no
communal riots, yet mutual mistrust and an
uneasy co-existence characterized Muslim-
Hindu relations. 
By the 1980s, facing increasing competi-
tion from Muslims and feeling discriminated
against by the Kashmir government, many
educated Hindus took up jobs in India. Si-
multaneously, increasing migration among
Muslim professionals to the Gulf and the
West and the resulting remittance economy
created a nouveau riche, whose opulent
lifestyle clashed with that of the conserva-
tive working and lower-middle classes.
While socio-economic disparities grew, mid-
dle and lower-middle-class Muslims aspired
to greater political power. With the NC re-
peatedly giving in to blackmail by the C o n-
gress, most Kashmiris looked for an alterna-
tive political party. Hoping to crush opposi-
tion, the Congress played the ÔreligiousÕ
card and harped on the differences be-
tween Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus; Paki-
stani propaganda echoed this theme. Politi-
cal and economic conflict was interpreted in
ÔreligiousÕ terms by all concerned, and in-
creasingly Kashmiris sought solace in ortho-
dox forms of their respective religions. The
Iranian revolution, the Soviet (ÔIndiaÕs
friendÕ) defeat in Afghanistan, IndiaÕs cold
shouldering the Afghan resistance, the rise
of the Central Asian republics and the Sikh
movement for ÔKhalistanÕ now encouraged
Kashmiri Muslims to conceive of their own
empowerment in terms of Islam. With Kash-
miri Hindus increasingly considered pro-
Congress, hence pro-India and thus anti-
Kashmir, Kashmiri identity became synony-
mous with Kashmiri Muslim identity.
Resorting to arms
Indian policy now changed from co-op-
tion to confrontation, and in 1987 the Mus-
lim United Front (MUF), a conglomeration of
opposition groups voted for by some 60%
Kashmiris, was declared defeated. Waves of
strikes, assassinations, bomb blasts, kidnap-
pings and arson swept the Valley, peaking in
1990. The components of the MUF formed
armed outfits (Al Barq, Al Fateh, Al Jehad,
etc.), and thousands took up arms supplied
by PakistanÕs Inter Services Intelligence (ISI);
the first of these grew into the armed wing
of the JKLF. Coming from urban families
who had failed to penetrate the existing
economic networks, the militants were dan-
gerous to the Indian state, but also to the
Kashmiri ruling class. A violent movement
contesting the appropriation of resources
by a chosen few was imminent. Aspiring to
political power, expecting more direct help
from Pakistan and the West, and under-rat-
ing the Indian army, the middle class sup-
ported the militants, setting aside internal
socio-economic contradictions and averting
the dangers of f i t n a. With ISI training and
arms, the militants proclaimed j e h a d for po-
litical justice and k a s h m i r i y a t. This justified
extortion, kidnappings, and forcible entry
into wealthier Muslim homes; monetary
ÔcontributionsÕ were accepted in lieu of tak-
ing up arms. 
The attempt to combine radical Islam with
k a s h m i r i y a t failed, however. The call for j e-
h a d, coupled with the murder of some Kash-
miri Hindus, threats to many others, and the
Indian campaign to depict the issue as a
ÔcommunalÕ conflict terrified the vast major-
ity of Kashmiri Hindus into accepting Indian
help to flee the Valley. With their rapid de-
parture, the concept of k a s h m i r i y a t d i e d ;
but its demise was inevitable anyway: k a s h-
m i r i y a t meant little to Srinagar«s wealthy
Muslim Punjabis, who largely favour acces-
sion to Pakistan, rather than independence;
k a s h m i r i y a t was irrelevant for the Ôlibera-
tionÕ of areas outside the Valley; the mystic-
ally-oriented Islam typical for the Valley and
part and parcel of k a s h m i r i y a t was suspect-
ed by the funding agencies. Hence, k a s h m i r-
i y a t was discarded and replaced by more
militant Islamic concepts (e.g. jehad, muja-
hid, shahid, Nizam-e Mustafa). Though at-
tempts to enforce veiling, attendance at Fri-
day prayers and a ban smoking all failed,
womenÕs hair dressing salons and cinema
houses were forcibly closed, cosmetics and
alcohol were prohibited and bands of
armed youngsters combed the bye-lanes to
check on proper behaviour. Islamic guerrilla
groups Ð Allah Tigers, Al-Umar Mujahidin,
Hizbullah, Ikhwan-ul Mujahidin Ð multiplied,
with the mainly rurally recruited Hizb-ul Mu-
jahidin (HM), the JIÕs armed wing, dominat-
ing from 1990 onwards. India responded
with about 400,000 soldiers and militia, who
battled the militants, but also shot many
suspects and resorted to extreme physical
and psychological repression. Soon count-
less families grieved over those killed, tor-
tured, or raped; thousands were arrested;
hundreds disappeared without a trace, and
hundreds are still in prison. 
With arms and money flowing in, factional
shoot-outs escalated. By 1993 several Af-
ghans, Sudanese, Palestinians and Yeme-
nites joined the battle; the JKLF no longer
received much Pakistani help and became a
prime target of the HM. To survive, it de-
clared a unilateral cease-fire in 1994 that led
to its further splitting and to many of its
men joining the JamaÕat-ul Ulema-e Islami
(JUI)-linked Harkat-ul Ansar/Harkat-ul Muja-
hidin or the Markaz-ul Dawa-ul Irshad-
linked Lashkar-e Toiba (LT), demonstrating
that no discrete boundaries divide Ôfunda-
mentalistsÕ from Ônon-fundamentalistsÕ Ð
simply shades of grey representing varying
ad hoc strategies based on different aspects
and degrees of faith and on attempts to ful-
fil personal commitments to principles of
specifically Islamic justice. These principles
are also instrumentalized by various organi-
zations Ð the JI, the JUI, the ISI Ð to fight their
own battles in Kashmir. 
To curb in-fighting, many militant organi-
zations, including the JKLF and the JI,
formed the All Parties Hurriyat Conference
(APHC) with the common objective of press-
ing for Ôself-determinationÔ and the estab-
lishment of a society that is in keeping with
Islamic values. By spring 1999 there was rel-
ative peace in the Valley, with hundreds of
armed ex-militants from various groups em-
ployed by the Government to take suspects
and terrorize their kin. Like the Afghan Hizb-
e Islami and the Al-Badr Mujahidin, the
APHC supported the 1999 invasion by Pakis-
tan and the United Jehad Council (an apex
body of fourteen Islamic organizations) in
northern Kashmir; as the LT put it, this is Ôa
war between Islam and paganismÔ. More
than ever before, the concepts of Ôself-de-
terminationÔ and ÔKashmiri identityÔ defy
d e f i n i t i o n . '
